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ABSTRACT: Bradford Hill (1965) highlighted nine aspects of the complex evidential 
situation a medical researcher faces when determining whether a causal relation exists 
between a disease and various conditions associated with it.  These aspects are widely cited 
in the literature on epidemiological inference as justifying an inference to a causal claim, 
but the epistemological basis of the Hill aspects is not understood.  We offer an explanatory 
coherentist interpretation, explicated by Thagard's ECHO model of explanatory coherence.  
The ECHO model captures the complexity of epidemiological inference and provides a 
tractable model for inferring disease causation.  We apply this model to three cases: the 
inference of a causal connection between the Zika virus and birth defects, the classic 
inference that smoking causes cancer, and John Snow’s inference about the cause of 
cholera.   
 
Introduction 
Bradford Hill asked “In what circumstances can we pass from … [an] observed association 
to a verdict of causation?  Upon what basis should we proceed to do so?’’ (Hill 1965, p. 
295) Hill’s expertise lay in the relationship between work conditions and illness.  He often 
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had information that revealed associations among many factors, and he had to determine 
which factors, if any, cause which others.  He aimed to provide guidelines (what he called 
“viewpoints”) for justifying a particular causal inference.   
The Hill aspects are widely discussed and used in epidemiological inference, yet 
how they justify causal inference is poorly understood. Morabia (2013, p. 1526) remarked 
that “Hill’s viewpoints may be philosophically novel, sui generis, still waiting to be 
validated and justified.” 
We advance Hill’s contribution by interpreting his viewpoints as contributions to 
inference to the best explanation. We first introduce the Hill aspects, and then discuss 
explanatory coherentism based on the principles of explanatory coherence.  We then apply 
these principles to three cases of epidemiological inference using the ECHO model of 
computing explanatory coherence: the recent case of inferring a causal relationship 
between the Zika virus and birth defects, the classic case of inferring that smoking causes 
cancer, and the historical case of Snow’s inference to the cause of cholera.  Each case 
illustrates the central coherentist theme that justified inferences require balancing various 
lines of evidence with various competing theoretical claims.  Moreover, the cases illustrate 
the utility of the ECHO program for modeling epidemiological inference.  Finally, we 
provide a general interpretation of Hill’s aspects in terms of principles of explanatory 
coherence, and reply to objections to our approach.     
 
Hill’s Viewpoints 
Epidemiological inference is complex.  It is rarely obvious what statistically correlated 
factors are causally responsible for others.  It is typical for multiple possible causes to be 
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viable explanations.  Partial evidence is usually misleading.  Some of the identified 
associations normally conflict with expected theory.  In such a complex evidential 
situation, it is difficult to justifedly infer any causal relationship.  Even so, the need to 
improve public health makes it imperative to discern causal relationships.   
Hill’s viewpoints address this complex situation and provide particular questions 
that a medical researcher should attempt to answer.  Reordering his list, we group his nine 
aspects as follows: 
1. Temporality – does the putative cause precede the effect? 
2. Strength of association – is the association strong? 
3. Consistency of association – is the association consistent across a variety of 
conditions? 
4. Specificity of association – how specific is the association? 
5. Biological gradient – is there a strong dose-response curve (i.e., the curve of an 
independent and dependent variable)? 
6. Experiment – is the association supported by experimental study? 
7. Plausibility – how plausible is the causal claim given existing biological 
knowledge? 
8. Coherence – does the causal claim cohere with the existing history and biology 
of the disease? 
9. Analogy – how similar is the potential causal claim with other accepted causal 
claims? 
The first aspect, temporality, suggests that one should determine the beginning 
point of each factor and then formulate causal hypotheses guided by the rule that causes 
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come before their effects. Hill observed that the onset of certain factors is not always 
evident. Illnesses often have a long incubation period, and an illness may cause a particular 
factor rather than vice versa.  For example, Hill asked: “Does a particular diet lead to 
disease or do the early stages of the disease lead to those peculiar dietetic habits?” (Hill, 
1965, p. 297).  
The features of association are the strength of association, the consistency of 
association, the specificity of association, the biological gradient, and experiment.   The 
strength of association between a possible causal condition C and an effect E should 
examine the ratios of (i) C&E to C&~E and of (ii) C&E to ~C&E.  The first ratio compares 
the number of cases in which the putative cause and effect are present to the cases in which 
the putative cause but not the effect is present.  The second ratio compares the number of 
cases in which the putative cause and effect are present to the number of cases in which 
the effect is present without the putative cause.  Causal relations are consistent with a low 
ratio (i).  For instance, smoking causes lung cancer even though few smokers develop lung 
cancer.  The key to detecting this causal relation is that lung cancer is rare in non-smokers 
so that there is a strong ratio (ii) of smoking and cancer to not-smoking and cancer.     
The consistency of an association concerns whether it has been observed by 
different persons in different places at different times.  This aspect is aimed against 
alternative explanations of an association such as chance and bias.   Similarly, experiment 
looks for cases where removing a possible cause decreases an effect, also making less 
plausible alternative explanations such as chance and confounding factors. Consistency 
looks at existing studies in diverse circumstances, whereas experiment looks at 
interventional studies.  
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The specificity of association favors more precise causal paths over more general 
ones.  Workers at several chemical plants may develop an illness, suggesting that working 
at chemical plants cause illness.  But the suggestion is stronger if the association is limited 
to specific workers, sites, and diseases, and when there is no association between the work 
and other diseases.   
The last aspect of association that Hill mentioned is biological gradient, which 
corresponds to John Stuart Mill’s (1970; original 1843) method of concomitant variation.  
More of a cause is associated with more of an effect, and less of a cause produces less of 
an effect.  Evidence for the causal connection between smoking and lung cancer is 
enhanced by the fact that the number of cigarettes smoked per day is proportional to the 
rate of lung cancer.   
The guiding aspect of temporality together with the five aspects of association are 
alone inadequate to infer a causal relationship.  Causal inference should also be guided by 
theory, captured by Hill’s aspects of plausibility, coherence, and analogy.  Plausibility 
assesses how the potential causal relationship fits with general biological knowledge.  
Coherence assesses how the potential causal relationship fits with the history and biology 
of the disease.  Finally, analogy assesses whether the potential causal relationship is similar 
to other established causal relationships.   
The importance of background theory in causal inference is illustrated by the 
history of the practice of bloodletting.  Based on the theory that disease involved an 
imbalance of the four humors (blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm), bloodletting 
evacuated ‘bad blood’ from the body to restore the proper balance of the humors.  This 
practice was supported both by the association between bleeding patients and fever 
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reduction, and by the theory of disease as humoral imbalance.  The germ theory of disease 
introduced by Pasteur dramatically changed the biological background and led to the 
abandonment of bloodletting. A strength of Hill’s perspective is his sensitivity to the 
theoretical dynamics in causal inference.  
 
Explanatory Coherence  
The complexity of epidemiological inference suggests a coherentist interpretation.  
Evidence for a claim emerges from a body of information in which the relations of support 
between claims are bi-directional and may involve rejecting some of the originally 
accepted claims. On a coherentist picture of inference each claim in a body of information 
may contribute to the justification of any other (See, for example, Poston 2014, ch. 3). 
Medical researchers highlight the emergence of conclusions from evidence.  
Rasmussen et. al note the emergence of a causal relation in the case of the Zika virus.  They 
write,  “As is typically the case in epidemiology and medicine, no ‘smoking gun’ (a single 
definitive piece of evidence that confirms Zika virus as a cause of congenital defects) 
should have been anticipated. Instead, the determination of a causal relationship would be 
expected to emerge from various lines of evidence, each of which suggests, but does not 
on its own prove, that prenatal Zika virus infection can cause adverse outcomes.” (2016, p. 
1982) 
Dammann (2018) proposed that epidemiological inferences concerning the causes 
of disease can be understood in terms of explanatory coherence through Poston’s (2014) 
development of explanatory coherentism.  Furthermore, Dammann conjectured that 
Thagard’s (1989) ECHO model of coherence computation could provide a rigorous 
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account of such inferences.  We now develop Dammann’s proposal both specifically and 
generally. We show how Thagard’s principles of explanatory coherence apply to three 
important cases of epidemiological reasoning, all of which can be simulated using ECHO.   
We then describe more generally how these principles connect with Hill’s viewpoints and 
similar attempts to characterize inference in epidemiology.  Our results confirm and deepen 
the remark of Broadbent (2017, p. 104) that Hill’s reasoning is a good example of inference 
to the best explanation.  
Philosophers such as Wilfred Sellars (1973), Gilbert Harman (1973), and Ted 
Poston (2014) have argued that knowledge is justified by explanatory coherence:  you are 
justified in believing that P if P is part of the best explanation of the evidence as determined 
by coherence with everything that you know.  Thagard (1989) proposed a precise theory 
of explanatory coherence accompanied by a computational model, ECHO, which has been 
used to simulate numerous examples of scientific, medical, legal, and everyday inference 
(Thagard, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2012; Eliasmith and Thagard 1997; Nowak and Thagard 
1992a, 1992b).  
Box 1 presents principles of explanatory coherence. In the Zika case, the data 
(Principle E4) are the results of observations, for instance the Brazilian finding of a strong 
association between Zika virus infection and cases of microcephaly. The hypotheses are 
conjectures about what might be causing the data, for example that Zika virus causes 
microcephaly and other birth defects.  Principle E2 says that hypotheses cohere with what 
they explain, so the hypothesis that Zika virus causes birth defects coheres with the 
evidence concerning increased microcephaly in Brazil. Hypotheses can be stacked up in 
complex causal networks, for example Zika virus causes birth defects because of biological 
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mechanisms of infection disrupting cell growth. In accord with Principle E1, the coherence 
relation is symmetrical: hypothesis and data cohere with each other. In contrast, the 
probability of a hypothesis given data is usually very different from the probability of data 
given evidence.  
Principle E1. Symmetry. Explanatory coherence is a symmetric relation, unlike, say, 
conditional probability. That is, two propositions p and q cohere with each other 
equally.  
Principle E2. Explanation. (a) A hypothesis coheres with what it explains, which can 
either be evidence or another hypothesis; (b) hypotheses that together explain some 
other proposition cohere with each other; and (c) the more hypotheses it takes to 
explain something, the lower the degree of coherence. 
Principle E3. Analogy. Similar hypotheses that explain similar pieces of evidence 
cohere. 
Principle E4. Data priority. Propositions that describe the results of observations have a 
degree of acceptability on their own. 
Principle E5. Contradiction. Contradictory propositions are incoherent with each other.  
Principle E6. Competition. If P and Q both explain a proposition, and if P and Q are not 
explanatorily connected, then P and Q are incoherent with each other. (P and Q are 
explanatorily connected if one explains the other or if together they explain something.) 
Principle E7. Acceptance. The acceptability of a proposition in a system of propositions 
depends on its coherence with them.  
 
Box 1. Principles of explanatory coherence, from Thagard (2006). 
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Principle E3 recognizes that analogy can contribute to coherence, for example when 
Darwin (1859) argued that one of the supports for his theory of evolution by natural 
selection was the analogy with artificial selection carried out by breeders (Thagard 1978).  
In the Zika case, epidemiologists note analogous explanations such as the causation of birth 
defects by the rubella virus.     
 Principles E5 and E6 establish incoherence relations between hypotheses that are 
flat-out contradictory or merely competing to explain the same data. The alternatives to the 
hypothesis that the Zika virus causes birth defects are that something else causes birth 
defects, or that the defects occur randomly.   
Principles E1-E6 establish complex networks of data, explanations, and competing 
hypotheses at different levels. Principle E7 directs how to determine what to believe and 
what not to believe, based on how well a proposition (hypothesis or piece of evidence) fits 
with everything else. For example, the hypothesis that Zika virus causes birth defects 
should fit with all the data and outcompete alternative hypotheses.  In a complex evidential 
situation it is difficult to determine the best fit of all the explanatory constraints.  The 
computer program ECHO shows how to best satisfy these constraints.   
 
 
ECHO Simulations 
To determine overall coherence, the computer program ECHO uses a neural network 
algorithm for approximately maximizing coherence. ECHO represents each proposition by 
a unit, a simplified artificial neuron that is connected to other units by excitatory and 
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inhibitory links. As in real neurons, an excitatory link is one that enables one neuron to 
increase the firing of another, whereas an inhibitory link decreases firing. After cycles of 
excitation and inhibition, the firing rates (activations) of the units settle into stable patterns.  
 
Zika Simulation 
In the Zika example, we can represent the hypothesis that the virus causes defects by the 
unit ZIKA-CAUSES-DEFECTS, and the Brazilian association between virus and defects 
by a unit BRAZIL-ASSOCIATION. Then whenever principles E2 and E3 establish 
relations of coherence between two propositions, the units that represent the propositions 
get excitatory links between them. So ZIKA-CAUSES-DEFECTS and BRAZIL-
ASSOCIATION have an excitatory link between them that is symmetric in accord with 
principle E1. Principle E4 is implemented by making an excitatory link between a special 
unit EVIDENCE and any unit such as BRAZIL-ASSOCIATION that represents a 
proposition based on observation. Principles E5 and E6, which establish incoherence 
between competing hypotheses, are implemented by inhibitory links between units: when 
two hypotheses are incoherent, e.g. ZIKA-CAUSES-DEFECTS vs. OTHER-CAUSE, then 
the units that represent them get an inhibitory link between them.  
The acceptability of a unit is represented by its activation, corresponding roughly 
to the firing rate of a real neuron. Just as firing rates of neurons are determined by their 
excitatory and inhibitory neurons, the activation of units in ECHO are determined by their 
excitation and inhibition and the activation of the units to which they are connected. When 
the network settles (i.e. activations stabilize), the resulting activations (positive or negative) 
indicate whether the hypotheses and data represented by the units are accepted or rejected. 
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A test of the theory of explanatory coherence is whether examples such as the Zika virus 
can be plausibly modeled using the program ECHO. 
The neural networks used by ECHO are not biologically plausible because single 
neuron-like units represent complex propositions such as that Zika virus cases birth defects, 
and because the excitatory and inhibitory links between units are symmetric.  Thagard and 
Aubie (2008) showed how to translate ECHO networks into more biologically realistic 
networks with one-directional links between neurons in groups that collectively represent 
propositions. Techniques are now available for translating complex symbolic propositions 
into neural networks (Eliasmith and Thagard, 2001).  
The input to ECHO for the Zika virus simulation consists of statements of what 
explains what, analogies, and evidence, shown in box 2. Fleshed out, the main evidence 
and hypotheses are: 
E1. Infection is present during prenatal development. 
E2. Rare microcephaly is associated with Zika. Reports of fetuses and infants with 
microcephaly who are born to women with brief periods of travel to countries with 
active Zika virus transmission are consistent with Zika virus being a rare exposure. 
The defect, congenital microcephaly, is rare, with a birth prevalence of 
approximately 6 cases per 10,000 liveborn infants, according to data from birth-
defects surveillance systems in the United States. 
E3. Zika virus is in brain tissue. 
E4. A study during the outbreak in Brazil found a significant association between Zika 
virus infection and microcephaly. Eighty-eight pregnant women who had had an 
onset of rash in the previous 5 days were tested for Zika virus RNA. Among the 72 
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women who had positive tests, 42 underwent prenatal ultrasonography, and fetal 
abnormalities were observed in 12 (29%); none of the 16 women with negative tests 
had fetal abnormalities. The abnormalities that were observed on ultrasonography 
varied widely, and some findings lacked postnatal confirmation because the 
pregnancies were ongoing. 
E5. A study on subjects in French Polynesia found a significant association between 
Zika virus infection and microcephaly. 
E6. No results of an animal model with Zika virus infection during pregnancy and fetal 
effects have yet been published. 
E7. Birth defects are associated with rubella virus. 
E8. Animal models have shown that Zika virus is neurotropic, supporting biologic 
plausibility.  
E9. Zika virus infects neural progenitor cells and produces cell death and abnormal 
growth.  
H1. The Zika virus causes microcephaly. 
H2. There is some other cause of microcephaly. 
H3. Rubella causes birth defects. 
H4. The Zika virus is neurotropic. 
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; EVIDENCE 
(proposition 'E1 "infection-during-prenatal-development")  
(proposition 'E2 "rare-microencephaly-with-zika")  
(proposition 'E3 "zika-virus-in-brain-tissue")  
(proposition 'E4 "Brazil-more-microencaphaly-after-infection")  
(proposition 'E5 "Polynesia-more-microencaphaly-after-infection")  
(proposition 'E6 "no-animal-models")  
(proposition 'E7 "birth-defects-rubella")  
(proposition 'E8 "animal-models-neurotropic")  
(proposition 'E9 "Zika-produces-abnormal-growth")  
(data '(E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9)) 
 ; HYPOTHESES 
(proposition 'H1 "zika-virus-causes-microencephaly") 
(proposition 'H2 "other-cause") 
(proposition 'H3 "rubella-causes-defects") 
(proposition 'H4 "Zika-virus-is-neurotropic") 
; EXPLANATIONS  
(explain '(H1) 'E2) 
(explain '(H1 E1 E3) 'E4) 
(explain '(H1 E1 E3) 'E5) 
(explain '(H2) 'E6) 
(explain '(H3) 'E7) 
(explain '(H4 E9) 'H1) 
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; ANALOGY  
(analogous '(H1 H3) '(E4 E7)) 
; CONTRADICTION 
(contradict 'H1 'H2) 
Box 2.  Input to ECHO for Zika simulation. The parentheses and quotation marks 
are artifacts of the implementation of ECHO in the programming language LISP.  
 
Figure 1 provides a simplified picture of the causal network that ECHO turns into 
a neural network.  When ECHO is run, all units begin with activation 0, and after 118 
cycles of activation adjustment activations stabilize.  ECHO accepts the hypothesis that 
the Zika virus causes birth defects while rejecting the alternative hypothesis of some 
other cause. The specific numbers for activation are not significant: what matters is 
whether the final activation is above 0, indicating acceptance, or below 0, indicating 
rejection.  Hence explanatory coherence and the ECHO model explain how the 
conclusion that the Zika virus causes brain defects arises by inference to the best 
explanation. 
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Figure 1.  Causal and neural network for the Zika simulation, simplified.  Solid lines 
indicate excitatory links based on coherence from explanation.  The wavy line indicates 
an excitatory link based on coherence from analogy.  The dotted line indicates an 
inhibitory link based on incoherence from contradiction.  Hypotheses are shown in capital 
letters, and evidence in lower case. 
 
Smoking/Cancer Simulations 
One of the great public health accomplishments of epidemiology is the demonstration that 
tobacco smoking causes cancer and other diseases. Hill was one of the earlier researchers 
who found a statistical association between smoking and cancer (Doll and Hill, 1950), but 
the overall case that smoking causes cancer was made by the American Surgeon General 
(1964). This study used five “criteria” for establishing causal relationships based on 
statistical associations: consistency, strength, specificity, temporal relationship, and 
coherence. All of these are included in Hill’s viewpoints, and the four viewpoints not 
included in the report (biological gradient, experiment, plausibility, analogy) might be 
absorbed into coherence. Subsequent reports to the Surgeon General (e.g. 2010, 2014) 
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made an even stronger case that smoking causes many diseases, including various forms 
of cancer, cardiovascular and pulmonary problems, and reproductive effects.    
 
The Proctor Simulation 
Proctor (2013) reviewed the history of the discovery of the connection between cigarettes 
and lung cancer. He says that four lines of evidence converged to establish cigarette 
smoking as the leading cause of lung cancer: population studies, animal experimentation, 
cellular pathology, and cancer-causing chemicals in cigarette smoke. Population studies 
repeatedly found that smokers of cigarettes were far more likely to contract lung cancer 
than non-smokers. Animal experiments found that applying tobacco products to rabbits 
and mice led to cancer.  Cellular pathology research showed that smokers experienced 
damage to lung cells. Finally, chemical research determined that cigarette smoke contains 
many carcinogens. 
How these lines of evidence converged to back the conclusion that smoking causes 
cancer is a matter of explanatory coherence, as shown in figure 2. The hypothesis that 
smoking causes cancer explains why smokers and tobacco-applied animals are more likely 
to get cancer. The studies about cellular pathology and cancer-causing chemicals sketch 
the mechanisms which explain how smoking causes cancer, through the effects of 
carcinogenic chemicals on lung cells.  
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Figure 2. Explanatory coherence of the conclusion that smoking causes cancer, following 
Proctor (2013). Conventions are the same as in figure 1.  
 
The input for the ECHO simulation of this case is shown in box 3. After 95 cycles 
of activation adjustment, the neural network produced by this input settles, with positive 
activation of the unit smoking-causes-cancer indicating acceptance of this hypothesis, 
rejecting other-causes.  
; EVIDENCE 
(proposition 'population "population studies associate smoking and lung cancer")  
(proposition 'animal "animal experimentation associate tobacco and cancer") 
(proposition 'cellular "cellular pathology finds that smoking damages cells")  
(proposition 'chemicals "there are cancer causing chemicals in smoke")  
(data '(population animal cellular chemicals)) 
 ; HYPOTHESES 
(proposition 'smoking-causes-cancer "tobacco smoking causes cancer") 
(proposition 'other-cause "cancer has other causes") 
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; EXPLANATIONS  
(explain '(smoking-causes-cancer) 'population) 
(explain '(smoking-causes-cancer) 'animal) 
(explain '(chemicals cellular) 'smoking-causes-cancer) 
; CONTRADICTION 
(contradict 'smoking-causes-cancer 'other-cause) 
Box 3. Input to ECHO for Proctor simulation.  
 
 
John Snow’s Communication Theory of Cholera 
John Snow (1855) is considered one of the originators of epidemiology because of his 
arguments in the 1840s and 1850s that cholera is caused by communication via excremental 
evacuations. Tulodziecki (2011) has provided a thorough analysis of Snow’s arguments 
showing the explanatory power of his theory compared to the prevalent view that cholera 
results from miasma - bad air due to decaying matter.   
This analysis translates into explanatory coherence as shown in figure 3. The 
superior explanatory power of the communication theory comes primarily from its ability 
to explain numerous phenomena that the miasma theory cannot. For example, 
communication of “cholera poison” via evacuation explains why cholera usually starts with 
digestive problems and why people with bad hygiene got cholera more often than people 
with good hygiene.  In addition, the communication theory explains why physicians (who 
were careful about washing hands and not eating while visiting the sick) were less likely 
to get cholera than ordinary people. In contrast, on the miasma theory physicians would be 
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more likely to get the disease via miasmic effluvia from the sick people they visited 
(Tulodziecki, 2011, p. 312).  Figure 3 displays the superior explanatory power of the 
communication theory. 
 
Figure 3. Explanatory coherence of the conclusion that smoking causes cancer, following 
Tulodziecki (2011).  Conventions are the same as in figure 1.  
 
The relations between propositions shown in figure 3 generate the input to ECHO 
shown in box 4. In less than a second, with 142 cycles of activation updating, ECHO settles 
with the acceptance of H2 (communication causes cholera) and the rejection of H1 (miasma 
causes cholera).   
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; EVIDENCE   
(proposition 'E1 "people get cholera")  
(proposition 'E2 "medical men get less cholera")  
(proposition 'NE2 "medical men get more cholera") ; negative evidence 
(proposition 'E3 "cholera starts with digestive problems") 
(proposition 'E4 "people with bad hygiene get more cholera") 
(proposition 'E5 "there are isolated cases of cholera")  
(proposition 'E6 "the rate of infection increases with population")  
(proposition 'E7 "higher mortality rater for men than women")  
(proposition 'E8 "people get sick after proximity to sick people")  
(proposition 'E9 "cholera first appears at sea-ports")  
(proposition 'E10 "matter decays")  
(data '(E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10)) 
 ; HYPOTHESES 
(proposition 'H1 "miasma causes cholera") 
(proposition 'H2 "communication causes cholera") 
(proposition 'H3 "people inhale decayed matter") 
(proposition 'H4 "cholera is spread by evacuations");  
CONTRADICTIONS 
(contradict 'E2 'NE2) 
; EXPLANATIONS  
(explain '(H1) 'E1) 
(explain '(H1) 'NE2) 
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(explain '(H3 E10) 'H1) 
(explain '(H2) 'E1) 
(explain '(H2) 'E2) 
(explain '(H2) 'E3) 
(explain '(H2) 'E4) 
(explain '(H2) 'E5) 
(explain '(H2) 'E6) 
(explain '(H2) 'E7) 
(explain '(H2) 'E8) 
(explain '(H2) 'E9) 
(explain '(H4) 'H2) 
 
Box 4. Input to ECHO for Snow simulation.  
 
Connections with Epidemiological Standards for Causality 
Thagard (1998, 1999) described how an explanatory coherence account of reasoning 
concerning the causation of stomach ulcers by H. pylori bacteria fit well with the criteria 
of causality advocated by Evans (1993).  More generally, table 1 maps the relation between 
principles of explanatory coherence and additional ways that epidemiologists have 
characterized determination of causality, due to Hill (1965) and Shepard et al. (1994).  
Rasmussen et al. (2016) connected their inference that Zika virus causes birth defects with 
Shepard’s criteria, which map onto Hill’s viewpoints and Evans’s criteria as shown by table 
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1. These viewpoints and criteria are not necessary and sufficient conditions for causality, 
but serve as standards of evaluation.  
Hill’s viewpoints Evans’s criteria  Shepard’s criteria Principles of 
explanatory 
coherence 
1.  temporality 4.  temporally, 
disease follows 
exposure 
1.  exposure to the 
agent 
E2. explanation 
2. strength of 
association 
1.  prevalence 
2. exposure 
3.  incidence 
2.  epidemiology 
findings 
E2. explanation 
E4. data priority 
3. consistency of 
association 
 2. consistent findings 
3. delineation of cases 
E4. data priority 
E5. contradiction 
E7. acceptance 
4. specificity of 
association 
 4.  rarity of exposure 
and defect 
E2. explanation 
E5. contradiction 
5.  biological gradient 5. spectrum of host 
responses 
6.  measurable host 
response 
 E2. explanation 
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6.  experiment 7.  experimental 
reproduction 
8.  elimination -> 
reduction 
9. prevention of host 
response 
5.  experimental 
animals 
7.  experimental system 
for agent 
E2, explanation 
7. plausibility 10.  biological sense 6. biological sense E2. explanation 
(higher order) 
E3. analogy 
8. coherence 10.  biological sense  E5. contradiction 
E7. acceptance 
9. analogy  6. biological sense E3. analogy 
 
  Table 1.  Mapping of standards for causation onto explanatory coherence principles.  
 
According to principle E2, the hypothesis that an environmental condition causes a 
disease coheres with the evidence that it explains.  But if the disease precedes the condition, 
then there is no causation, hence no explanation, and hence no coherence. The rule that 
causes come before effects is not true a priori, because it is conceivable that time travel 
could enable a future event such as getting into a time machine in the year 3000 to cause 
an earlier event such as arriving in a place in the year 1000. But there has never been an 
observed case of the future causing the past, so the temporality rule is a reasonable way of 
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dismissing cases of backward causation.  Thus, failure of temporality blocks some 
applications of E2 where an explanatory cause happens after the event explained.  
Principle E2 is also key to understanding Hill’s aspects 2-6.  The hypothesis that an 
environmental condition causes a disease can explain why there are associations between 
the condition and the disease that are strong, consistent, and specific.  These explanations 
therefore enhance the coherence and acceptability of the causal hypothesis.  Alternative 
hypotheses such as chance and the occurrence of some unknown factor cannot furnish 
comparable explanations.   
Similarly, the hypothesis that a condition causes a disease explains why there is a 
biological gradient such that more of the condition causes more disease.  When 
experimental evidence of a successful intervention is available, it also increases 
explanatory coherence because the hypothesis that a condition causes a disease explains 
why changing the condition changes the disease.  Alternative hypotheses concerning 
chance and unknown factors cannot mount similar explanations, and hence gain no support 
from E2.   
Principles E4, E5, E6, and E7 are also relevant to understanding why aspects 2-6 
help to indicate causality. E4 (data priority) ensures that evidence collected by observations 
and experiments gets a degree of priority over hypotheses.  E4 does not imply that data are 
always taken at face value, because observations and experimental results can be mistaken; 
but it does help to ensure that evidence will have a greater contribution to coherence than 
hypotheses that may be fanciful.  Aspects E5 and E6 set up a battle between the hypothesis 
that a condition causes a disease and its alternatives, either because the alternative is flat-
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out contradictory (e.g. cause vs. chance) or merely competitive in cases where multiple 
causes might be operating.   
One weakness of Hill’s method is that he gave no indication of how all the aspects 
can be combined into an overall inference that a condition causes a disease.  Principle E7 
asserts that maximizing coherence is the key to evaluating a causal hypothesis and other 
beliefs.  E7 does not say how to maximize coherence, but the construal of coherence as 
constraint satisfaction and the availability of various algorithms for approximately 
maximizing coherence (including the neural network algorithm used by ECHO) takes care 
of this problem.  From the explanatory coherence perspective, medical researchers should 
use Hill’s aspects to establish non-rigid constraints that need to be coherently satisfied.  
The ECHO program then determines best overall fit. 
Hill’s aspects 7-8 of plausibility and coherence also fall under the theory of 
explanatory coherence.  They urge that a causal hypothesis should fit with general 
biological and medical knowledge.  Principle E5 (contradiction) handles the most extreme 
case where a new hypothesis contradicts what is generally believed.  As Hill noted, 
contradicting orthodoxy does not always provide the grounds for rejecting a hypothesis 
because the orthodoxy may be wrong.   
Another source of fit with biological and medical knowledge comes from the 
availability of higher-order explanations.   The hypothesis that smoking causes cancer 
became more plausible once mechanisms were understood for how the ingredients in 
smoke irritate tissues and encourage the development of mutations that lead to growth of 
tumors.  Also relevant is E7 (coherence) which encourages an overall fit with all 
knowledge, not just the narrow domain in which the causal hypothesis operates.    
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Hill’s ninth aspect, analogy, encourages that a causal hypothesis be analogous to 
other kinds of explanations used in biology and medicine.  Analogy is taken care of by 
Principle E3 of explanatory coherence, and analogical reasoning can also be understood as 
a kind of parallel constraint satisfaction (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995).   
 
 Objections and Replies   
Our explanatory coherence account of epidemiological reasoning generates worries.   
1.  Explanation.  The theory of explanatory coherence is empty without an account 
of the nature of explanation.   
Reply.  Explanation follows different patterns in different fields (see Poston (2014), 
pp 70-80).  For example, the hypothesis that the Zika virus causes birth defects explains 
the evidence that in Brazil the virus is associated with microcephaly because of a partially 
understood mechanism where the parts are viruses and neurons, the main interaction is 
infection, and the regular changes are defective neurons and brains.  In contrast, Snow 
lacked a detailed understanding of the mechanism of cholera infection, which needed the 
germ theory developed by Pasteur in the 1860s.  
2. Causality.  The hypothesis that a condition causes a disease is meaningless 
without an understanding of causality. 
Reply:  Hill acknowledged the difficulty of analyzing causality, and no definition 
has ever survived for long.  But causality can be characterized using the method of 3-
analysis, which is based on a new theory of concepts that describes how they combine 
exemplars (typical examples), typical features, and explanations (Blouw, Solodkin, 
Thagard, and Eliasmith 2016).   There are many familiar exemplars of causes, such as 
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pushes, pulls, motions, collisions, actions, and diseases whose effects are symptoms 
(Thagard, forthcoming).   
The typical features of causality include: 
1. Causes happen before effects.    
2. Causes operate in sensory-motor-sensory patterns, e.g. when you see and feel a 
bike not moving, move the pedals, then see and feel the bike move.    
3. Cause and effects sometimes yield regularities, for example that hitting your 
finger with a hammer always hurts.    
4. Statistical dependencies occur, with causes increasing the probabilities of effects.  
5. Manipulations and interventions lead from causes to effects.   
None of these typical features is a necessary or sufficient condition of causality, but 
matching a lot of them suggests that cause/effect relations have been identified.  There 
are obvious relations between these 5 typical features of causality and the 
epidemiological criteria in table 3.   
Such relations provide explanations of why things happen and how they can be 
changed.  Causality in particular cases is explained by the presence of underlying 
mechanisms connecting cause and effect. Before concluding that C causes E, you need to 
consider alternative explanations such as that E has a different cause, or that C and E are 
both caused by something else, or that E occurs randomly.  We cannot directly observe 
causal relations, but can infer that they exist as part of the best explanation of systematic 
observations, in accord with explanatory coherence. 
3. Inferences against causality.  Epidemiology sometimes leads to the rejection of 
causal hypotheses, not just their acceptance. 
 28 
Reply. Explanatory coherence understands the rejection of causal hypotheses as 
resulting from the acceptance of alternatives concerning other causes, chance, bias, or 
confounding. For example, the popular hypothesis that stomach ulcers are caused by excess 
acidity was rejected because of the explanatory coherence of the new hypothesis that 
bacteria cause ulcers (Thagard 1999). More recently, the hypothesis that multiple sclerosis 
is caused by compromised flow of blood in veins to the head has been largely rejected for 
many reasons. Factors include the shoddiness of initial studies used to support the 
hypothesis, the conflicts of interest of the investigators who proposed it, the failure of more 
careful studies to find that balloon angioplasty reduces the symptoms of multiple sclerosis, 
and the finding that the correlation between venous insufficiency and multiple sclerosis is 
dubious (Traboulsee et al., 2014; Kruger, Patel, and Lee, 2015). All of these factors could 
be incorporated into an explanatory coherence analysis and ECHO model of rejection of 
the hypothesis that venous insufficiency causes multiple sclerosis.   
 
Conclusion 
Our paper addresses causal reasoning in epidemiology, but explanatory coherence extends 
to other kinds of medical inference. Thagard and Larocque (2018) model mental health 
assessment as inference to the best explanation performed by ECHO. Other forms of 
diagnosis can also be construed as abductive inference, i.e. inference to the best explanation 
(Josephson and Josephson, 1994; Peng and Reggia, 1990), in ways that naturally translate 
into explanatory coherence.  For example, physicians who diagnose lung cancer in patients 
can take into account all of (1) evidence explained by the diagnosis such as coughing and 
test results, (2) history of heavy smoking which explains why the patient got sick, and (3) 
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alternative explanations such as emphysema. Finally, reasoning in evidence-based 
medicine concerning the effectiveness of medical treatments can be understood as 
inference to the best explanation (Thagard, 2010), but detailed analysis in terms of 
explanatory coherence remains to be developed.   
More narrowly, we have provided an epistemological interpretation and 
justification for Bradford Hill’s influential recommendations about how to infer causality 
in epidemiology.  Our interpretation is based on the epistemology of explanatory 
coherentism, fleshed out using a detailed theory of explanatory coherence.  We have shown 
the applicability of this approach by applying the ECHO computational model for 
calculating explanatory coherence to three important cases of epidemiological reasoning, 
concerning the Zika virus, smoking, and cholera.  The result is a deeper understanding of 
the nature of medical inference concerning the causes of disease.   
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